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0 F

THE

THE

SUPREME
STATE

C 0 U R T

0 F UTAH

A. C. MC CALL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
VS.

TH0111AS H. YEJ''DTGCK, and
R. F. SCHOBER~ an(~ UNION

PACIFIC RAILRCAI. CC: iPJJJY,
and OGDEI\ UNION ?L.Ii }]},.L\'.'
DEPOT C0!,1P ANY,

Defendants end Respondents.

STATD1~:F~

This is

jury in the

B.n

OF THE CASE

aT'PC!:ll from a verc:ict of a

Distric~~

c,lLlrt

of 1.J'eber County,

Utah, the Honorable Parley Norseth, Judge
thBreo.f, pres ~-dine.

For the convenience of

the court and counseJ., the

r~P.rties '~Arill

be re-

ferred to as they 1..rere in the lower court
wherein the appellant 1.-.ras the plaintj_f'f and

the appelJ. ee was the o_efE-mdant..

This appeal

is on questions of law only, and therefore only
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such parts of the transcript, and such excerpts
as are relevant and pertinent to the law questions
raised are made a _;Jart of this record.
Plaintiff's amended compl8.int (omitting
headi~"'.(?:2 ~md

signr-:t1)rcs), is as follows:

Plaintiff complains of the defendants and
for cause o:r act ion
1.

2 lleges:

That at ali tir:es herelnafter set forth

the defendant, Ogden Union Railway and Depot.
Company,
CompE>.ny,
sxistins;
State of
Utah .
:~.

and defendant, Union Pacific ?v::1ilroad
t.rere corporations du~y orgrmized and
undf':-r B.nd by virtue of the lm-rs of the
Utah 2,nd doing business in 'Heber County,

That at al1 tir1r-:'!s here1.nafte::' Eet forth

the defenda_nt, Thomas H. Y:endrick ~ 1:U:•.S an employee and agent of the defendantt Unj_on Pacific
Railroad Company, regulc:.rly srtJr;loyed by said
railroad Company and acting ·:~Ti thin the scope of
his employment.

3. That at all times here1na.fter set forth
the defendant, R. F. Schober, !rJas an agent and
employee of the defendant, Ogden Union ?~.A.il vay
and Depot Compe.ny, regularly employed by s.:1id
rail~rn.y and depot company and acting within the
scope of his emp1c;nre:nt.

4. That on the mornirg of the 27th day of
November 1952, the ple.int].ff 1N·J.s e.rrested and
charged with a misd.f?!('Ennor by the defend,-::: nts"
Thomas H. Kendrick :?nc1. R. F. Sehober, at V-:le
Club Tavern, Ogden, Utah; that at said time cllld
place the aforesaid ThomE.S n. Yendrick and R. F.
2
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Schober were acting in the course of their employment as aforesaid; that said arrest was wrongful
and without warrant or judicial order, or other
authority of law; and at said time plaintiff was
acting in a quiet, peaceable and law-abiding
manner, and he had not committed any breach of
the peace nor committed any offense, either a
misdemeanor or felony, in or out of the presence
of the defendants, or any of them; that in the
process of said arrest, pl~intiff was assaulted
at the Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company
station, and again assaulted and dragged out of
the Club Tavern in said Ogden City, Utah, by said
defendants.

5. That the defendants, Thomas H. Kendrick
and R. F. Schober, unlawfully and wrongfully,
under their authority as agents and employees of
the defendants, Union Pacific Railroad Company and
Ogden Union RaD_way and Depot Company, respectively, took plaintiff and caused him to be detained
and confined in the police station of said Ogden
City, Weber County, Utah, and had the plaintiff
booked as being drunk, and then and there by force
and violence wrongfully and unlawfully, without
process or commitment of any kind whatever had
the said plaintiff incarcerated in the tank of
said Police Headquarters in Ogden City which said
tank is part of the jail at said Ogden City.
6. That on or about the 28th day of November,
1952, at Ogden, Weber County, Utah the defendants,
and each of them, contriving, maliciously and
intending to injure the plaintiff; falsely,
maliciously and without probable cause procured
and caused certain criminal processes to be issued
against the plaintiff charging the plaintiff vith
the commission of a criminal offense, to wit: the
offense of drunkeness; that said complaint bears
the file number of 27613 in the office of the
Clerk of the City Court of Ogden City, Weber
County, Utah.
3
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7. That thereafter, on the 28th day of
November, 1952 plaintiff was arraigned upon said
complaint and entered a plea of 11 not guilty",
that on the 16th day of December, 1952, said case
against plaintiff came on for trial for the
supposed crL~e so charged by the defendants, and
each of them, before the Honorable J. Quill
Nebeker, Judge of the City Court of Ogden City.
That at the conclusion of said trial said Judge
Nebeker found the plaintiff "Not guilty".
8. That by reason of the premises, plaintiff
has suffered great pain and mental anguish and has
been da~aged in his good name and reputation all
to his damage in the sum of $10,000.00.
9. That in doing the things herein alleged,
the defendants, Thomas H. Kendrick and R. F.
Schober, acted maliciously and were guilty of
wanton disregard of the rights and feelings of
the plaintiff, and by reason thereof, plaintiff
demands exemplary and punitive damages against
the said defendants in the s~~ of $10,000.00.
\ffiEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment
against said defendants, and each of them as
follows:
1. For the sum of $10,000 as compensatory
damages;
2. For the sum of $10,000 as exemplary and
punitive drunages;

3.

For attorney's fees, costs of suit; and

4. For such other and further relief as to
the court may deem proper.
To this complaint, the defendants Thomas

H~

Kendrick and R. F. Schober, filed their answer to

4
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to amended complaint as follows, (omitting headings and signatures):
Come now the defendants, Thomas H. Kendrick
and R. F. Schober and by way of answer to the
amended complaint of the plaintiff on file herein admit, deny and allege as follows:
1. Answering paragraphs 1 to 5, inclusive,
of said amended complaint these defendants incorporate by this reference their answers to
paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiff's original complaint on file in this action and make the same
answers to said paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiff's
amended complaint as was heretofore made by these
defendants to paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiff's
original complaint.
2. Answering paragraph 6 of said amended
complaint these defendants admit that on or about
the 28th day of November, 1952, the plaintiff was
charged in the City Court of Ogden City, State of
Utah, with the commission of a criminal offense,
to-wit: the offense of drunkenness; and further
admit that said complaint was signed by T. H.
Kendrick. Defendants deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph 6.

3. Answer'ing paragraph 7 of said amended
complaint the defendants deny +.hat the plaintiff
appeared in court and was arraigned on the 28th
day of November, 1952, and allege the fact to b~
that said plea of "not guilty" va.,.:; enterec.

_for the plaintiff by a Judge of the City
Court of Ogden City in the absence of said plain-

tiff. These defendants further aclmi t that said
criminal case came on for trial on the 16th day
of December, 1952, before a Judge of the City
Court of Ogden City and that the plaintiff 1..ras
found not guilty at said trial. Defendants deny
each and every other allegation in said paragraph
7 set forth not hereinbefore in this paragraph
of this answe·r specifically adm.i tted.
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4. Answering paragraph 8 of said amended
complaint these defendants deny the same.
5. Answering paragraph 9 of said amended
complaint these defendants admit that the plaintiff demands exemplary and punitive damages from
these defendants. Said defendants deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph 9.

6. Further answering- said amended complaint
these defendants deny each and every allegation
thereof not hereinbefore in this answer specifically admitted.
7. Further ansvrering said amended complaint
and as a separate defense thereto said defendants
allege that the plaintiff was arrested by them
pursuant to their responsibilities as peace
officers of the State of Utah·, and that said
arrest was in all respects lm-rful and proper pursuant to the statutes and laws of the State of
Utah; and further allege that the filing of the
complaint charging this plaintiff with a misdemeanor by T. H. Kendrick was~· in all respects
lavful a.'rld. proper pursuant to the statutes and
laws of the State of Utah, and these defendants
further a.llege that their conduct in all partiCtl1ars v.ras in good fait'h and based upon their
hone$t conclusions from fact observed by them.
WHEREFORE, said defendants pray that they be
given judgment in their favor, and that the
plaintiff take notr~ing by reason of his complaint,
and that in addition th~reto these defendants and
each of them be avmrded reasonable attorney's
fees and costs pursuant to the provisions of the
statutes of the State of Utah.
The

npfpr...:

r-

J.-

Union Pacific Railroad

Company and the Ogden Union Railway and Depot
Company filed their ansvrer to the amended complaint
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6

as follows, (omitting headings and signatures):
Come now the defendants, Union Pacific
Railroad Company and The Ogden Union Railway
and Depot Company and by way of answer to the
amended complaint of the plaintiff on file
herein admit, deny and allege as follows:
1. Answering paragraphs 1 to 5, inclusive,
of said amended complaint these defendants incorporate by this reference their answer to
paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiff's original complaint on file in this action and make the same
answers to said paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiffts
amended complaint as was heretoi'ore -made by
these defendants to paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiff's original complaint.
2. Answering paragraph 6 of said amended
complaint these defendants admit that on or
about the 28th day of November, 1952, the
plaintiff was charged in the City Court of Ogden
City, State of Utah, with the commission of a
criminal offense, to-wit: the offense of
drunkenness; and further admit that said complaint was signed by T. H. Kendrick. Defendants
deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph

6.
3. Answering paragraph 7 of said amended
complaint the defendants deny that the plaintiff
appeared in court and was arraigned on the 28th
day of November, 1952, and allege the fact to
be that said plea of ttnot guilty" was entered
for the plaintiff by a Judge of the City Court
of Ogden City in the absence of said plaintiff.
These defendants further admit that said
criminal case came on for trial on the 16th day
of December, 1952, before a Judge of the City
Court of Ogden City and that the plaintiff was
found not guilty at said trial. Defendants
deny each and every other allegation in said
paragraph 7 set forth not hereinbefore in this
paragraph of this answer specifically admitted.
7
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4. Answering paragraph 8 of said amended
complaint these defendants deny the same.
5. Answering paragraph 9 of said amended
complaint these defendants allege that said paragraph 9 of plaintiff's amended complaint is
immaterial as to these defendants. Further
answering said paragraph 9 these defendants admit
that the plaintiff demands exemplary and punitive
damages from the defendants Thomas H. Kendrick and
R. F. Schober. These:defendants deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph 9.

6. Further answering said amended complaint
these defendants deny each and every allegation
thereof not hereinbefore in this answer specifically admitted.
7. Further answering said complaint and as
a further and separate defense these defendants
allege that the arrest of the plaintiff by the
defendants, Thomas H. Kendrick and R. F. Schober,
and the charging of the plaintiff with a misdemeanor in the City Court of Ogden City by the
defendant T. H. Kendrick was all done pursuant to
the authority of said individuals as peace
officers of the State of Utah; that the same was
done in good faith; and that said arrest and said
complaint ~-Tere in all respects la"t-rful and proper
under the statutes and laws of the State of Utah.
WHEREFORE, said defendants pray that they be
given judgment in their.favor and against the
plaintiff "no cause of action u' for their costs
of suit herein, and for such other and further
relief as to the court shall seem just and equitable in the premises.
On the basis of the foregoing pleadings trial
was had and the case submitted to the jury on the
basis of the evidence adduced thereat, and upon
the court's instructions.
8

Plaintiff objects to
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and raises upon this appeal the correctness of _
instructions numbers 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, and

17.

Said instructions are set out more particu-

larly as follows:
No. 4.
Gentlemen of the jury, you are instructed that the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff to prove by a pre-·
ponderance of the evidence, or the
greater weight of t4e evidenqe, each and
every allegation made by him in hi~
complaint before you can find a verdict
in his favor.
And if you find and determine
from the evidence introduced in this
case that the plaintiff has failed to
establish the burden of proving the
allegations of his complaint by the
greater weight of the evideace, then
it is your duty to bring in a verdict in
this case against the plaintiff and in
favor of the defendants, no cause of
action.
But if you find from the evidence
introduced in this case that the plaintiff has proven each of the allegations
of his complaint by the greater weight
of the evidence, then it is your duty
to bring in a verdict in his favor,
against the defendants.
No. 5
You are instructed that the
defendant Kendrick was not, on the
27th day of November, 1952, a special
deputy sheriff of Weber County, Utah,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
9 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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November 27, 1952, provided
as follows:

"32-7-13. Drinking and
drunkenness in public places.-No person shall drink liquor in
a public building, park or
stadium or be in an intoxicated
condition in a public place."
"32-8-10. Drunkenness in
public place.-- Everyone who
violates any of the provisions
of section 32-7-13 shall be
liable for a first offense to
a penalty of not less than $10
nor more than $50 and in default of immediate payment, to
imprisonment for not more than
thirty days; for a second
offense to a penalty of not
less than $25 nor more than
$100 and in default of immediate payment to imprisonment
for not less than one month
nor more than two months. For
a third or subsequent offense,
to imprisonment for not less
than one month nor more than
six months~·'wi thout the option
of a fine.n
You are also instructed that the
statutes of this State provided as
follows:

"32-8.,.25. Duties of officers
respecting infringements of this
act.--All inspectors appointed
under this act, and all sheriffs,
deputy sheriffs, mayors, city
judges, justices of the peace,
constables, marshalls and peace
officers, and all district,
11
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county, city and town attorneys, and clerks of courts
shall diligently enforce the
provisions of this act.***"
Under these statutes it was not only
the right of the defendants Schober and
Kendrick but their positive duty under
the law of this State to arrest the
plaintiff if, in fact, he was in an intoxicated condition at the depot in
Ogden on November 27, 1952.
No. 9
You are instructed that the statutes of the State of Utah in effect at
the time of the plaintiff's arrest provided, in so far as material here, are
as follows:
"77-13-3. A peace officer may,
without a warrant, arrest a person
for a public offense committed or
attempted in his presence."
Said statutes in effect at the
time of the plaintiff's arrest also
provided, in so far as is material
here, that:
"77-13-4· A private person
may arrest another for a public
offense committed or attempted
in his presence."
You are further instructed that one
of the ordinances of Ogden City in
effect on November 27, 1952, provided
as follows:
"Drinking liquor in public
places and drunkenness. Any person
who shall drink any intoxicating
12provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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liquor in any street or
alley, public place, store,
restaurant, hotel lobby or
parlor, in or upon any passenger coach, street car or other
vehicle cornmonly used for the
transportation of passengers,
or in or about any depot platform, waiting room or station
room or in any public gathering of any kind, or vrho shall
be drunk or intoxicated \·rithin
the corporate limits of said
City, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor."
Under the foregoing statutes and
the foregoing ordinance, Mr. Kendrick
and Mr. Schober had a legal· right to
arrest the plaintiff i f he violated
said ordinance while in the presence
of said officers. Therefore, if you
believe that the plaintiff did violate
said ordinance in the presence of
1-'lr. Kendrick and Mr. Schober on
November 27, 1952, then I instruct you
that his arrest by these men was not
unlawful and the prosecution therefore
was not 1-rrongful or improper, and your
verdict must be in favor of the defendants, no cause for action.
No. 10
You are instructed that a person is
drunk or intoxicated within the meaning
of the Ogden City ordinance I have
quoted to you when he is under the influence of intoxica.ting liquor to such
an extent that he is not entirely himself. It is not necessary that a person
be "dead drunk" or "hopelessly drunk 11
in order that he be considered drunk or
intoxicated within the meaning of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ordinance. If a person has consumed
enough intoxicating liquor that his
mental or physical capacities or his
judgment o~ his normal control of his
actions have been materially i.'rrl.paired,
then such person is drunk or intoxicated within the meaning of those
words as they are used in that ordinance.
No. 12
You are instructed that if you
find Er. Kendrick had reasonable and
probable cause for believing that the
plaintiff was intoxicated in violation
of said ordinance of Ogden City, and
further, that Mr. Kendrick did honestly
and fairly believe. that the plaintiff
was intoxicated in violation of said
ordi.nance at the time t.Jhen Mr. Kendrick
signed the complaint charging the
plaintiff with said violation, then
there was no malicious prosecution of
the plaintiff; and you should not award
the plaintiff any damages against any
defendant for such prosecution, even ·
though you now believe, in light of all
the circumstances shown by the evidence,
that the plaintiff vras not actually
drunk or intoxicated on November 27,
1952, at the depot in Ogden, in violation of said Ogden City ordinance.
No. 15
You are instructed that if you find
from a preponderance of the evidence
that Mr. Kendrick made a full, fair and
t~1thful disclosure of the facts which
he knew, or which he might have learned
by reasonable diligence, in any way
connected with the events of November 27,
1952, to the Assistant City Attorney, Mr.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sneddon; and further, that Mr.
Sneddon advised Mr. Kendrick that
he had probable cause to initiate
the prosecution of the plaintiff
for the offense of violating the
Ogden City ordinance quoted in
these instructions; and that Mr.
Sneddon thereafter prepared the
complaL~t which Mr. Kendrick signed;
and that Mr. Kendrick in good faith
did believe that there was probable
cause to initiate that prosecution,
then that is a complete defense to
the portion of this action in which
the plaintiff alleges a malicious
prosecution of him by the defendants;
and in such event, you are instructed
that you should award the plaintiff no
damages against the defendants for said
alleged malicious prosecution.

No. 17
You are instructed that the
plaintiff, in addition to actual
damages, asks that he be awarded
punitive damages in the sum of
$lO,OOOoOO. You are instructed that
punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, mean damages given by
way of punishment for the commission
of a wrong. Punitive damages are only
allowed where a wrong is committed under
circumstances evidencing an evil motive,
~ctual malice, deliberate violence, or
vindictiveness. You are instructed
that you may allow punitive damages
where a wrong is committed under such
circu~stances as the court has just
described, but7ou shou~d not do so
unless you find from a preponderance
of the evidence that Mr. Kendrick or
Mr. Schober acted with evil motive,
actual malice, deliberate violence,

15
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or vindictiveness. Punitive or exemplaiJ damages are not the measure of
the actual damages sustained, but are
damages given by way of punislli~ent to
make an example, for the public good,
and to deter others from offending in
a similar manner. Such damages are
not given as a matter of right, but
as punishment. Punitive damages are
to be awarded with caution. Such
damages should not be disproportionate to the actual damages sustain~d,
if any, and sho1ild bear some relation
to the damages complained of and the
cause thereof.
If you find for the plaintiff and
assess punitive or exemplary damages
in addition to actual damages, you
must, in the form of the verdict, set
up the actual and punitive damages
separately.
On the basis of the instructions given and
the evidence, the jury returned a verdict no
cause of action, whereupon the plaintiff filed
a motion for new trial, basing his arguments
primarily upon the refusal of the court to grant
his proposed instructions 3, 7, 8, and 14, on
the court's rulings as set forth in paragraph 1
of plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
The motion for a new trial was denied and
thereafter the court awarded attorney's fees to
the defendants pursuant to the provisions of

16
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Title 78-11-10 UCA 53.
Thereafter, and within the time

a~~owed

by

law, plaintiff served and filed his notice of
appeal to this court and filed his statutory
undertaking upon appeal to this court.
ASS IGNHENT OF ER...li.ORS

1.

That the court erred in giving ins true-

tion number 4 relative· tol the burden of proof.
2.

That the court erred in refusing to

give plaintiff's proposed instruction number 7.

3.

That the court erred in refusing to

give plaintiffts proposed instruction number 8
and in awarding defendant Schober attorney's fees.

4. That the court erred in giving its
instruct.ion number 5.

5. That the court erred in giving its
instruction number 8.

6. That the court erred in giving its
instruction number 9.
7.

That the court erred in giving its

instruction number 17 and in refusing to grant
plaintiff's proposed instruction number 21.

17
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8.

That the court erred in giving its

instruction number 10.

9.

That the court erred in giving its

instruction number 15.

ARGUMENT
I

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NIDIDER
4 RELATIVE TO THE BURDEN OF PROOF

This instruction advises the jury that the
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove by
a

preponderance af the evidence

~

and every

allegation made by him in his complaint before the
jury can find a verdict in his favor.

The jury is

here advised that if the plaintiff fails to prove
all the allegations of his complaint by the greater
weight of the evidence, that it is then their duty
to bring in a verdict against the plaintiff and in

favor of the defendant.
The instructions as to the burden of proof are
of primary importance in aiding the jury to interpret the facts of the case to the law of the case.
Errors and ambiguities in defining the burden of
18
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proof and in interpreting it to the jury can
result in substantial prejudice to the rights of
a

litigant~

The general rule is that the burden of
proof is on the party who has the affirmative of
an issue as determined by the pleadings and a
party pleading a fact has the burden of proof as
to that fact or issue.
The la'l:J on th:is subject further provides

that the plaintiff has the burden,of proof as to
the elements of his cause of' action, at"ld the

defendant has the bu.rden of establishing special
or affirmative defenses.

31 CJS

Evidenc~

Section 104.

This rule of law regarding the burden of
proof has been

Yu;~ther

defined as follows:

"The

burden is upon the plaintiff to allege and establish the facts upon 't.Jhich he relies for recovery. 11
Eagle Picher Mining and Smelting Co. vs Layton,

77 P(2) 1137.
Applying the accepted rules of law to the
instant case

vJe

find that the plaintiff alleged

19
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the

~allowing ~acts

1.
2.

3.

to constitute his complaint:

False arrest and ~alse imprisonment by the de~endants.
Malicious prosecution by the
de~endant Kendrick.
That plaintiff' was entitled to
punitive d~ages for such
malicious prosecution, false
arrest and imprisonment.

There is no interdependence of these charges,
the charge of false arrest and false imprisonment
is a charge which stands alone and is not directly
related to, nor dependent upon, the establishment
of' the charge of malicious prosecution and punitive damages.
The error of this Instruction No. 4 is most
clearly apparent when it is realized that not only
did the court fail to advise the jury of the fact
that the false arrest charge could stand by itself,
but that the court went further and advised the
jury of the exactly opposite proposition.

The

court in Instruction No. 4 stated that the burden
of proof was upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance

or

the evidence each and

~

allega-

tion made b-y him in his complaint before the jury
could find a verdict in his favor.
20
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,, .

The prejudice of this instruction to the
plaintiff's case can easily be seen if one would
assume from the evidence that the

ju~J

may have

found that plaintiff had been falsely arrested
and falsely imprisoned, but further found that

the element of malice on the part of the defendants was not proved and that for that reason
the case of malicious prosecution and subsequent
Applyint:,

DU:."litive damages "t-:ras not

Ins':;TU.ction Noo 4 to such finding of facts by
the jury}' it could only

h~_ve

resulted in the

entire verdict going aga.".:Lt th: plaintiff and
b

favor of dsfendant ;:;Vf6£L thougq: the j_ury §~

flEe; ,.L~~!.))[:~ tb.at the a11Ggations of f'r,lse arrc:s·L
a-YJ.d false imprisorunent had been proved to their

satisfaction ..

In such. a fact situation, a situation which
is not at all improbable under the pleadings and
proof of the instant

case~

the unfair burden of

proof required by Instruction Noo 4 could only
have had the effect of causing plaintiff to fail

in his entire cause even though the jury were
21
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-

\1

satisfied that he should prevail in his claim f"or
false arrest and imprisonment.
An examination of the rules concerning the

burden of proof in criminal cases is very helpful
in an analysis of the errors complained of by
plaintiff in Instruction No. 4.

The general rule

regarding the burden of proof in a criminal proceeding is as follows:
"The burden in a criminal case,
whether for a misdemeanor or felony,
is on the prosecution to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt, that is to prove every essential
element of the crL~e charged, every fact
and circumstance essential to the guilt
of the accused, as though the whole issue
rested on it." 22 CJS Criminal Law, Sec.

566.
It can be readily seen that the state has the
burden of proving every essential element of the
crime and every fact and circumstance essential to
the guilt of the accused and that the failure to
prove any one element or any fact and circumstance
essential to the guilt will result in a failure of
the entire case of the state.
The court, in giving Instruction No. 4, im22
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posed an even greater burden upon the plaintiff
in this case than is imposed upon the state in

a criminal case.

The requirement that the plain-

tiff must prove each and every allegation of his
complaint mis.led the jury in that it did not make
any distinction between allegations that were:
(1) essential to making out a cause of action,
(2) allegations that '!,.Jere not essential to making

out a cause of" acticn, (3} allegations that were
admitted by the defendant's answer,

(4) allega-

tions that concerned the cause of action for
false arrest and imprisorrrnent, and (5) allegations that concerned only the issues of malicious
prosecution and punitive damages ..
The svreeping requirement of proving each and

everz_ allegtltion of -the complaint, t·!ithout the
qualif~Ting

words of "material allegation", and

vrithout any explanation regarding the distinctions
set out above could only have resulted in misleading the jury as to the proper burden of proof required of the plaintiff.

Such an error certainly

prejudiced the plaintiff's cause in the minds of
the juryo
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The case of the American Lumber and Export
Company vs Love, 84 S 559, was an action against
a

sheriff on his official bond and the court gave

the following instruction to the jury:
.

"The court charges the jury that the
burden is upon the plaintiff in this
case to prove to a reasonable certainty
every material allegation of its complaint, and, unless the jury find that
the plaintiff has met such burden by a
preponderance or the evidence, then the
verdict must be fo~the defendant."

The court held that the foregoing charge was
reversable error ror the reason that it required
too high a degree of proof by the plaintiff.

It

can be readily seen that the requirements for
proof on the part of the plaintiff in the above
case are substantially less than that required
by the court in Instruction No. 4.
In the case of Eagle Picher Mining and

Smelting Company vs Layton, 77 P(2) 1137 ,Oklahoma,
the following instruction was given:
W!ou are instructed that the burden
of proof is upon the defendant to prove
by a fair weight and preponderance of
the evidence, all of the material allegations set forth in its answer as submitted
to you in these instructions, except such
matters as are admitted by the plaintiff to be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
true."
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The court reversed a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for the reason that the foregoing
instruction was error, in that it placed a
greater burden upon the defendant than is placed
upon him by the settled rule of law in such
cases.

The court in commenting on the instruc-

tion said:.
"It is a universal and unvarying rule of law that the burden is
upon the plaintiff to allege and
establish the facts upon which he
relies for his recovery; to allege
and establish such facts as will
entitle him to recover. The underlying principle in which it is
planted and from which it has had
its growth constitutes one of the
pillars of civil jurisprudence.u
In all of the foregoing cases the instruc-

contained merely the language to the effect that
the burden was upon the plaintiff to establish
the material allegations of his complaint, and yet
in this case, Instruction No.

4 required the

plaintiff, not to establish the material allegations of his complaint, but to establish each
and every allegation of his complaint and stated
further that if the plaintiff failed to establish
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the burden of proving the allegations of his complaint by the greater weight of the evidence, that
it was then the duty of the jury to bring in a
verdict against the plaintiff and in favor of the
defendants.
An early Utah case, Stevens vs Stephens, 47
P 76, is concerned with the question of the plaintiffls burden of proof.

In that case the complaint

alleged that the defendants were indebted to the
plaintiff for goods sold.

The answer denies all

allegations of the complaint and then affirmatively alleges that when the goods were bought
plaintiff and defendants were directors in four
corporations and that defendants ordered the goods
in qgestion for the corporations, that the plaintiff knew they were being furnished for the corporation, and that no part of the goods were
received by defendants, except as such agents or
managers.
After stating the foregoing facts the court
held as follows:
"o~.counsel for the plaintiff requested
the
court to rule that under the pleadSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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..
ings the burden of proof was on the
defendants, but the court held that
the burden of proof was on the plaintiff, and so instructed the jury. This
action on the part of the court is set
out as one of the causes of complaint.
It is quite clear that both counsel s.nd
court were in error. As an abstract
proposition or law, the statement of
the court to the jury that 1 the burden
of proof is upon the plaintiff, and he
must establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, the material allegations
of his complaint,' is doubtless correct;
but we are apprehensive that, under the
pleadings, its application in this case,
without stating the position which the
defendants occupied respecting the onus
probandi, was not only erroneous, but
misleading to the jury as to the proper
mode of determining the questior: at
issue.. The plaintiff i.-Ias bound ·co
make out a prima facie case, but he ·
-vms not bound to prove, in the first
instance, that the defendants w-ere
not acting as agents 1..rhen they crder:?d
the goods. The mere fact that agency
was set up in the ansvTer raised no prr:sumption that such a relation actually
existed. Agency was made the basis to
defeat the plaintiff's claim, and therefore it was incumbent upon the defendants to establish it by affirmative
proof. If, in a court of justice, one
undertakes to make out a case against
another, or, by affirmative defense,
to release himself from the claim of
another, the burden is on him to furnish the proof to make good his contention. Whart. Ev. I I 356, 357. In the
case at bar the onus was on the plaintiff to prove his case substantially as
alleged.. Then, when this was done, it
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vras incumbent upon the defendants,
i~ order to release themselves
from the plaintiff's claim to
show that the goods were ordered
by them as managing agents for
the corporations, and sold by the
plaintiff with the understanding
that they -v1ere being purchased by
the corporations, as alleged in
the answer. The court having
failed to instruct the jury
properly on the question of the
gurden of proof, the cause must
be reversed~ and, this being so,
we do not deem it necessary to
discuss the ~uestions upon the
evidence raised in the course
of the trialo The cause is
reversed and remanded, with
directions to the court belovr
to set aside the order appealed
from., and grant a new trial,"
The general rule in regard to errors in

placing the burden of proof-1s stated as follows

"It is regarded as reversable
error l.oJhen the instruction places
the burden on the vrrong party, or
places on a proper party a greater
ourden than proving his case by a
preponderance of the evidence."
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II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7
Defendants Kendrick and Schober in paragraph
7 of their answer to the amended complaint pled
the affirmative defense of good faith, and added
for good measure the allegation that their conelusions were honest.

As a result of these alle-

gations an issue was raised by the pleadings.
This issue was granted further cognizance in the
court's instruction number 2 as follows:
"Further answering the allegations
of plaintiff and as a further and separate
defense these defendants allege that the
arrest of plaintiff by the defendants
Kendrick and Schober and the charging of
the plaintiff with a misdemeanor in the
City Court of Ogden City by the defendant Kendrick vms all done pursuant to
the authority of said individuals as
peace officers of the State of Utah;
that the same was done in good faith
(italics ours)."
It will be observed that the allegation of
good faith was therefore doubly forced upon the
consciousness of the jurors and the court at no
time ever intimated nor instructed that such did
not constitute a valid defense for any of the

29
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defendants.

It must be borne in mind that the

reason for plaintiff's arrest which was admitted
by the defendants was a violation of the City
ordinances of Ogden City; to-wit:

drunkenness,

and that such was in fact a misdemeanor.
A.TJ. investigation of the law relative to the

defenses available to individuals charged with
false arrest and false imprisonment indicates that
probable cause and good faith is a defense where
the wronged party was charged with the commission
of a felony but is not a defense where the
individual is charged with a misdemeanor.

The

Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Oleson vs.
Pincock, 251P.23 had before it this precise question which, interestingly enough, also arose in
Weber County, Utah.

In the Oleson case plaintiff

brought an action for false imprisonment and
alleged that the defendants forceably and unla'ltrfully deprived him of his liberty.

Among other

things, the defendant attempted to allege the
defense of good faith.
this argument

ve~J

Justice Frick disposed of

succulently at page 26:
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"Where an officer has good cause
for making the arrest in a felony case it
is a defense, but merely to show good
cause for making an arrest in a misdemea~or
is not a defense."
The most recent pronouncement on this sulject that we have been able to discover is the
case of Ware vs. Dunn, California 183 P(2l

In that case the plaintiff registered

~·

in the

Schuyler Hotel, Long Beach, California and advised the desk clerk that her husband t.Jas in the
Navy and 1-ras expected in that evening.

She

attempted to register for both of them and thereafter her husband arrived at the hotel and in the
course or- time retired to their room.

After the

couple had gone to bed, t,_.m police officers and
an agent of the hotel rapped o-n the door and
forced their way into the room, on the pretext
of making an investigation, and plaintiffs filed
action charging assault and false imprisonment.
From a judgment for the plaintiff the defendants
appealed,

a~leging

that they had acted in good

faith, and the court rulul on the contention as
follo'f..JS:
31
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"In the case with vrhich we are here
concerned the only justification for the
officers to invade the sanctity and privacy of plaintiff's room, '"hich was then
their home, was the right to make an
arrest. As heretofore pointed out,
appellant officers were without such
authority. Their entry under pretended
color of official right was therefore
an ~buse of the authority invested in
them as peace officers, and relegated
them to the category of trespassers.
n***the mere belief ol suspicion that
a misdemeanor is being, or has been,
com."llitted is insufficient to warrant a.11
arrest without a warrant; nor may an
arrest -vlithout a warrant be made on a
belief, founded on information received
from a third person, that a misdemeanor
is being committed." (6 C.J.S., Arrest,
Sect. 6, pp. 594, 595.) An Officer cannot justify an arrest on his nr,;:·sonabls
belief 11 that the person arrested ·Has then
committino- a misdemeanor (Adair v. Vlilliams,
24 Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853, 26 A.L.R. 278,
282). Nor is it sufficient that the
officer believed that the person apprehended was engaged in the comm~ssion of
a misdemeanor, though such belief may
have been entertained in the utmost good
faith (State v. Bradshavr, 53 Nont. 96,
161 P. 710; State v. Small, 184 Iowa 882,
884, 169 N. '!.tJ. 116; HcGuire v. State, 19
-~la. App. 138, 95, So. 565). The cases
.;,,Rt cited are based on statutes simil~r
to ours ')n the right of a peace officer
to make an arrest '1..-rithout H warrant."

L.--st there be any confusion as to the application of this decision to the facts at bar, Sect.
837 of the California Penal Code provides:

32
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"A private person may arrest
another: for a public offense committed or attempted in his presence."
Section 836:
"A peace officer may without a warrant
arrest a person, (1) For a public offense
committed or attempted in his presence."
The relevant Utah statutes provide:

77-13-4: "A private person may
arrest another for a public offense
committed or attempted in his presence."
77-13-3: "A peace officer may
without a warrant arrest a person for
a public offens€ committed or attempted
in his presence."
It does not require any careful scrutiny
to ascertain that the California statutes and the
Utah statutes are identical.
The law in the Ware case is still the law
in California as illustrated by the case of

Hanna vs. Raphael Weill and Co., 203 P(2) 564
where the court stated:
"It is a settled rule that a police
officer may not make an arrest for a
misdemeanor that has not been committed
in his presence."
This conforms to the case of Daniels vs.
Milstead, Alabama (1930) 128 So. 447, where

33

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff sued the defendant, a deputy game warden,
and his bondsman for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

The plaintiff was arrested

without warrant and incarcerated in the county jail
for allegedly hunting without a license.

The court

discussed the problem of probable cause and good
faith and held:

"In false imprisonment, the essence
of the tort is that plaintiff is forceably deprived of his liberty; and the
good intent of the defendant or the fact
that he had probable cause that the
offense was committed and that he acted
in good faith will not justify or excuse the trespass. Crumpton vs. Newman,
12 Ala. 199, Rich vs. Mc!nery, 103 Ala.
345, 15 So. 663, Gallon vs. House of Good
Shepherd, 158 Micho 361, 121 NoW. 631. 0
Relying on the law heretofore set

fort~

the

plaintiff submitted his proposed instruction
number 7 as follows:
"Neither an officer nor a private
person can justify an arrest on his
reasonable belief, that the person arrested was then committing a misdemeanor.
The offense must have been committed. If
the plaintiff was not guilty of the
offense for which he was charged, then
you must find for the plaintiff. "Reasonable belief" or "good faith" on the part
of the defendants is not a defense.
Cal. 183; P(2) 133 1947."
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Which was refused by the court.

No comparable

instruction was at any time given by the court
nor was the jury even by inference instructed that
probable cause and good faith was not a defense.
III
THAT THE COURT ERRED m REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 8 AND IN AWARDING DEFENDANT SCHOBER ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff's proposed instruction requested
the court to instruct the jury that neither Mr.
Kendrick nor Mr. Schober were special officers.
The court in the first line of its instruction
number 5 stated:
"You are instructed that the
defendant was not on the 27th day of
November 1952 a special deputy of
Weber County, Utah and was not by law
authorized to perform the duties of a
special deputy sheriff in said County

"
The court, on the other hand, by inference in its
instructions number 8 and number 9 in effect ruled
as a matter of law that the defendant Schober was
a special officer.
This view is confirmed by the court's subsequent granting of an allowance of $250.00
·.

35
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attorney's fees to the defendant Schober based
upon the provisions of 78-11-10 U.C.A. 1953 which
provides for an attorney fee to be awarded in any
action filed against a sheriff, constable, peace
officer, state road officer or any other person
charged with enforcement of the criminal laws of
this State in the event that the judgment in the
cause is against the plaintiff and for the defenda.nt.
This would seem to be conclusive of the
finding by the Court that Mr. Schober was in fact
a special or public officer of the State of Utah,
and more particularly of Ogden City.

We submit

that this is an iricorrect conclusion for the
following reasons:
(1) Title 10-6-61 U.S.C. 1953
provides: "The Board of Commissioners
of each city.of the first or second class
shall create, support, maintain and control a police department and a fire department in their respective cities."
Nowhere is the word "special policeman" provided,
although by the provisions of 67-12-4 the appoint.
ment of special police officers by the governor

36
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The question therefore arises

as to whether or not the power of creating a
police department carries with it the pm.rer to
create special policemen of the type and nature
presently before the court, or of any type.
Utah has not ruled upon this precise question,
however it is submitted that the Utah case of
Nasfell vs. Ogden City, 249 P(2) 501 lays down
the test that must be applied and is in fact
controlling.
The court -vrill recall that in that case
the court had before it the problem as to whether
or not the power of Ogden City given by statute
to regulate streets and the parking of vehicles
for a fee included v.Tithin it the implied power to
establish a rule of evidence bearing upon the
court.

The court ruled in the negative and

stated as follows:
"It has been r~=>nP ... +.t=>dly stated
by this court a municipil corporation
possesses and can exercise the follo'l.-ring powers and no others: First, it
is granted in express words; second,
it is necessarily or fairly implied
in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, it is essential to the
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accomplishment of the declared objectives and purposes of the corporation not simply convenient but essential. 11
Certainly it cannot be held that there was any express grant.

It is difficult to conceive that one

can make a necessary implication that authority to
create a police department necessarily includes the
power to appoint special officers.

It ·tvould be

absurd to contend that the appointment of special
officers was either a convenience or indispensible
to Ogden City.

It was, vJe vJill concede, a con-

venience to the railroads but to no others.
In the case.of Utah Hapid TraLsit Company

v. Ogden City, 58 P(2) 3 it was held that the
statutory authority of a city to construct, maintain and operate street railroads carried with it
no

L~plied

power to operate motor busses.

We sub-

mit that it is self-evident that the duty to maintain a police department for the protection of the
general population in no \vay be deemed to carry
1trith it the implied power to appoint a special
officer for the Union Pacific Railroad.
(2)

The Utah Supreme Court in Sheriff of
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Salt Lake County vs. Commissioner of Salt Lake
County, 268 P 783, held that before a regular
deputy sheriff could assume the duties of his
office, three things had to occur:

(a)

the

sheriff had to appoint him; (b) the appointment
had to be confirmed by the Board of Commissioners;
(c) the deputy sheriff had to file and sign his
oath of office.

The Chief of Police of Ogden

City, M. J. Schoor-, testified that it was
necessary for Mr. Schober to file an oath of
office (Tr 18).

Counsel for the defendant then

introduced defendant's "Exhibit 2 11 which provides:
I do solemnly swear I will support,
obey and defend the Constitution of the
United States, the Constitution of this
State, and the ordinances of this City,
and that I will discharge the duties of
my office with fidelity, said office
being Special Officer for O.U.R.&D. Ry.
Co. /s/ R. F. Schober."
11

•
The defendant, by the introduction of his own
exhibit, testified more vividly than anything

plaintiff can say that at no time was he ever a
special officer of the Ogden City Police Department or of any Department of Ogden City, and that
the only office, if so it can be called, that he
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held was that of a special officer for his
employer.
(3)

Even if it can be maintained that the

statutes of Utah authorize the appointment of
special police officers of Ogden City and the_t
defendant Schober had done all the things necessary
to qualify him to so act, nevertheless, an examination indicates that before Mro Schober can be held
to have been acting in the capacity of a special
officer of Ogden City, it must be found that the
essential elements of master and servant in fact
existed bet1-1een Ogden City and the defendant herein.

One of these essential elements is the element

of control.

As is stated in 56 C.J.S., Master and

Serva...nt, Section 2{dl, the relationship of master
and servant exists v.rhen and only -v.rhen the employer
retains the right to direct the manner _-in which
the business shall be done as 1t1ell as the result
to 1G accomplished, or, in othc'r
1;(

,.~rords,

not only

e...., shall be done, but hm-r it shall be done; and

the existence of such right of control has been
said to be the really essential element of the
~elationship.
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This rule was adopted in Utah in Gleason
vs. Salt Lake City, 74 P(2) 1225.
case the

plainti~~

was injured.

In the Gleason

tripped over a fire hose and

She sued Salt Lake City, a munici-

pal corporation, and the Auerbach Company, a
corporation.
tendent

o~

The facts Showed that the superin-

Auerbach Company telephoned the fire

department and requested that the water be
pumped from an elevator

sha~t.

The Chief

the

o~

Salt Lake City Fire Department sent regular

~ire-

men who were on duty for the City and who were
being paid their regular salaries by the City to
do this work.

They took orders from the master

mechanic, and the master mechanic from the Fire
Chief.

The court found that the negligence, if

any, of the firemen could not be imputed to the
Auerbach Company, because the relationship of
master and servant did not exist, and at Page
1228 said:
"The right of control and the
exercise of such right was a determining factor in fixing the liability
of the employer, notwithstanding the
employee was paid wages by another."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41

The court quoted vrith approval from Phelps vs.
Boone, 67 Fed 2nd 574 at Page 575 where it was
stated:
11

The·usual test in such circumstances, that is to say the determination of liability on the part of a
servant is the right or power on the
part of the person charged to command
and control the servant in the performance of the casual act at the amount
of performance. Under the conditions
the employer or master is the person who
at the moment has power of control."

In the instant case, R. E. Edens, the superintendent of the O.U.R.&D. Railway Company- the company
that employed and paid

Y~.

Schober, made the

following application for appoLntment of special
police:
"APPLICATION~FOR

APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL

POLICE
"Application is hereby made for the
appointment of the following OUR&D Co.
employees, per list attached, as special
officers without pay from Ogden City, to
serve for the limited time of 365 days, in
Ogden City with duties confined to the
railroad.
"This application is made upon the
distinct understanding and condition that the
said employees are not employees of Ogden City
and are not. subject to or under the control or
supervision of the Chief of Police or any
other representative or official or directing authority of Ogden City, but on the
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contrary, are my employees and are
under my supervision, direction and
control and are paid by me, and she~l
act wholly and solely in accordance
with the duties required by me as his
employer.
"And I hereby agree to protect and
save harmless the said Chief of Police
and Ogden City, of and from any and all
loss, cost, liability, damage or expense
of said appointment, and particularly
with respect to the requirement's of
the Workmen's Compensation Law of the
State of Utah and otherwise.
"Dated at Ogden, Utah, this 15th day
of danuary, 1952.
ttSigned /s/ R. E. Edens
Supt., The Ogden Union
Railway & Depot Company
Address: Ogden, Utah 11
Note 't.Jho

exercise~_,,E:3J2~Vision

and directs Nr.

The transcript of Mr. Edens' testimony OlD_y
confirms what he has written in his application.
The testimony of the Chief of Police is as
follows:

"Q

At any time since the date that
application for appointment in
January of 1952 has R. F. Schober
acted under your direction or
supervlslon, or as an officer of
the Ogden City police force?

"A

No, sir."
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If in the Phelps case the firemen of Salt
Lake City could not be determined to be the agents
of the Auerbach Company because the latter had no
control over their activities, it is submitted
that the acts of Mr.

Schober cannot be held to

be performed as an agent or special officer of
Ogden City v.rhen the latter enjoyed the same lack
of control, and that therefore it must be concluded
that on the basis of the testimony, not only of the
Chief of Police of Ogden City, but of

~T.

Schober's

O\m immediate employer, any acts performed by him

were performed in the course of his employment and
under thE direction of Mr. Edens.

Co., Mich. 104 N.W.

38~,

plaintiff sued the defen-

dant railroad alleging that he was ejected and ir:jured by an employee of the defendant.

The defense

was raised that the individual vlho caused the
plaintiff to be ejected and injured was in fact a
special deputy sheriff.

The court discussed this

problem, saying:
"Many instances are therefore found
in law books where the public authorities
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have appointed police officers to
preserve order in these places, but
at the expense of those responsible
for them. So the public authorities,
in this case, appointed deputy sheriffs
with the same powers and duties as they
would exercise in any other place. When
acting purely in their capacity as police
officers, the defendant is not responsible
for their acts. Only when the defendant,
through its authorized agents has employed or directed such police officers to
act for it, does it become responsible."
It

follow~

therefore, that the admitted

facts show a lack of any control on the part of
Ogden City and that the duties of Schober of
necessity were those of an individual and an
employee.

It further follovrs that he was not a

special officer nor was he acting as such, but as
a result thereof, he was not entitled to attorneys
fees vrhich could only have been granted to him had
he been in fact a public officer acting in such
capacity.
IV

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 5

The portion of Instruction number 5 which
the plaintiff alleges to be in error reads as
follows g
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11You are instructed that the defendant Kendrick was not on the 27th day of
November 1952 a special deputy of Weber
County, Utah, and was not by law authorized to perform the duties of a special
deputy sheriff in said county, but you
are further instructed that on the 22nd
day of November the aforesaid Kendrick
was a special agent of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company and he was, by virtue of
the laws of the State of Utah and ordinances of Ogden City hereinafter referred to,
authorized to make lawful arrests in the
Union Depot at Ogden, Utah."

It is submitted that while the instruction as such
is technically correct, it is so grossly misleading as to result in confusion in that it implies
that Kendrick enjoyed some status not enjoyed by
the ordinary mortal.

It is true that as special

agent he was authorized to make a lawful arrest.
It is likewise true that any person at or in the
Union Depot at Ogden on the 27th day of November,
whether they be a special

agent~

ordinary employee,

passenger, or a guest of the Union Pacific Railroad, had the power to make a lawful arrest.
It was found in the Hanna case, supra:
"Insofar as the employer respondent
is concerned all this discussion as to the
status of White seems to be idle since the
arrest was originally made by Methoe who
was not a special officer but merely an
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employee hired to protect her
employers' property."
That was precisely the status of

~~.

Kendrick on the 27th day of November 1952.

He

was merely an employee hired to protect his emplayers' property.

Any statement by the court

that in any way embellishes or adds to, or gives
him color or office could not be other than prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff.

v
TF~T THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION
NID1BER 8

The court's 8th instruction reads as
follovTS:
"You are instructed, .that the statutes of this State in effect on November
27, 1952, provided as follows:
"32-7""'13 ~ Drinking and"' .
drunkenness in public places •••
No person shall drink liquor in
a public building, park or stadium
or be in an intoxicated condition
in a public place."
"32-8-10. Drunkenness in public
place.--Everyone who violates any of
the provisions of section 32-7-13
shall be liable for a first offense
to a penalty of not less than $10
nor more than $50 and in default or
immediate payment, to imprisonment
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for not more than thirty days; for
a second offense to a penalty of
not less than $25 nor more than
$100 and in default of immediate
payment to imprisonment for not
less than one month nor more than
two months. For a third or subsequent offense, to imprisonment
for not less than one month nor
more than six months without the
option of a fine."
You are also inst~~cted that the
statutes of this State provided as follows:
"32-8-25. Duties of officers
respecting infringement of tpis ac~.-
All inspectors appointed under this
act, and all sheriffs, deputy sherirfs,
mayors, city judges, justices of the
peace, consta.bles, marshals 2.nd peace
officers, and all district, county,
city and town attorneys, and clerks
of courts shall diligently enforce
the provisions of this act. -tH**"
Under these statutes it was not only
the right of the defendants Schober and
Kendrick but their positive duty under the
law of this State to arrest the plaintiff
if, in fact, he \.Tas in an intoxicated condition at the depot in Ogden on November 27,

1952. 11
The court 1,.rill recall that by the pleadings
it has been admitted that the plaintiff was arrested for an alleged violation of the ordinances of
Ogden City.

It likewise was admitted that a

criminal action was filed against the plaintiff

·.
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Ogden City.

It is submitted, therefore, that it

must be self-evident that the statutes of the
State of Utah were in no way involved in the
action, and must be considered entirely irrelevant except as it permits a jury to find that the
plaintiff might not, nevertheless, have committed
a violation other than the violation charged by
reason of the State statutes.

Further, the last

paragraph of the instruction is completely at
variance with instruction number 5 in that it nm. r
states that because Kendrick is a special officer
he had a duty to arrest the plaintiff, when in
fact, the court had just finished instructing the
jury to the effect that Mr. Kendrick was not a
deputy sheriff.
If there need be any further evidence to
the effect that the 5th instruction set forth immediately al:xwe was misleading and prejudicial, it
must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff by the
immediate subsequent act of the court in calling
Mr. Kendrick a special officer.

This begs the

issue as to the status of M:r:·· Schober.
··

Plaintiff

·submits that on the basis of the law and evidence
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heretofore set forth, the instruction
inapplicable to him.

is equally

How, it might be asked,

could the defendants Schober and Kendrick, have a
positive duty as officers, to enforce the law if
they, in fact, were not officers?

How can anything

be inferred other than the fact that the court has
not only declined to find that Schober was not an
officer, but has taken out the question of fact as
to whether he was or was not from the jury, by his
statement that Mr. Schober, as a special officer,
had a positive duty?

How can any conclusion be

reached other than the fact that this instruction
flies in the face of, and repudiates the facts and
instructions theretofore given?

VI
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 9
The same statements made in the preceeding
objection to instruction number 8 can be repeated
in instruction number

9. Again,

in said instruc-

tion, the court referred to Mr. Kendrick and Mr.
Schober as officers, not as employees.

Again the

court, as it has throughout its instructions, gave
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a status to these employees to which they were
not entitled, and implies a protective cloak which
is without meaning in lm,r, in view of the fact that
by statute, the right to arrest by an individual
for a misdemeanor is the same as the right of an
officer to arrest for a misdemeanor.

Again the

court misled, confused and prejudiced the rights
of the plaintiff.
VII
THAT THE COURT ER?ED IN GIVING ITS ll{STReCTION
NUNBER 17 AND IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION ~~illER 21

Plaintiff makes exception to the court's
instruction nui11ber 17 because the court failed to
instruct that the jury could consider the financial status of the defendant in considering the
problem of punitive or exemplary damages.

The

plaintiff's proposed instruction number 21 fully
covered this problem and stated in part:
"As an element in considering the
amount of punitive damages, you may
consider the wealth of the defendants
because a verdict that may punish a
person of limited means may not be of
exemplary effect upon a defendant of
very substantial means and wealth."

51
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In the case of Hilson vs. Oldroyd.l 207 P(2) 759,

Judge Crockett stated:
"It is well settled that it is
proper to receive evidence and to consider the wealth of the defendant as
bearing upon the issue of punitive
damages. It is obvious that the same
amo~mt of money might be a greater
punishment to a poor man than it wou~d be
to a rich one .. "
In addition to the Florida case of Kilgore

Ki=._go re

2

v~.

""'.9 S (2) 3Q5, we might also refer the

court to the case of

Boic~-

vse Bradley Mining

Co., Idaho 1950 92 Fed Suop 750 and the case of
farrqtt vs .. Bank of America, Calif. 217 P(2) 89.

In the Boice case the court stated:
"Plaintiff, a doctor, sued John
Bradley, an individual, and the Brad~ey
Mining Co., a corporation, for malicious
prosecution and false imprisomnent. One
of the questions raised on appeal was
'I.<Thether it 'I.<TaS proper to consider the
vreal th of the defendant in considering
damages. The court found it v.ras proper,
sayingg
"Beyond the broad general rule just
mentioned, there are special considerations
singularly applicable to the case at bar.
According to the great weight of authority,
the defendantVs pecuniary ability may be
considered in fixing the amount of punitive or exemplary damages. There was
arr~le evidence in the case from which the
52
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jury could have inferred and must almost
certainly have inferred that the defendant, Bradley Mining Company was a
wealthy company. There is also authority that the status of the plaintiff
may be considered in fixing the amount
of the awardo"
VIII
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION
NmffiER 10
Instruction number 10 reads as follows:
"You are instructed that a person
is drunk or intoxicated within the meaning of the Ogden City ordinance I have
quoted to you when he is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such
an extent that he is not entirely himself. It is not necessary that a
person be "dead drunk" or "hopelessly
drunk" in order that he be considered
drunk or intoxicated within the meaning of the ordinance. If a person has
consu~ed enough intoxicating liquor
that his mental or physical capacities or his judgment or his normal control of his actions have been materially
impaired, then such person is drunk or intoxicated within the meaning of those
words as they are used in that
ordinance."
It is submitted that the instruction is
not correct in that one may be not entirely himself and not have his mental or physical capability materially impaired.

However, in view of

the other and infinitely more serious errors of
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which plaintiff complains, he is not disposed
at this time to labor the court about this
point except to observe that such error is
cumulative and overpowering when considered
with all the other errors present.
IX

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 15

In excepting to the court's instruction

num?er 15, the plaintiff is not unaware of the
decision of the

Supra~e

Court of Utah in UHR

vs. Eaton, 80 P(2) 925 and as a result plaintiff will not concede that the facts produced
at the trial do not warrant the instruction for
the reason that the transcript of the evidence
is not available before this court.
There is, however, a second basis for
objection that can be made at this time.
In

5~

Corpus Juris Secundum entitled

''Malicious Prosecution", Section 8lb the text
states~

"In suits for malicious prosecution,
the defendant may in a proper case~ plead
specially facts and circumstances which
54
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refUte malice and show affirmatively
assistance of probable cause, or show
that the defendant acted on the advice of couns~l ••••• However, if
defendant thus resorts to a special
plea or answer it is not sufficient
for him to state the matters of defense in general terms, as, for
instance, that he had probable cause,
or acted on advice of counsel, but
the facts constituting the defense
must be alleged."
It will be seen as a matter of law the
defense may be classified as an "affirmative
defense."

This is also the position of the

Supreme Court of Utah which seemed to be held
in the UHR case whe:re it is called an affirmative

defense.
Under the provisions of Rule 8c of Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, it is mandatory that a
warty set forth affirmatively all matters which
constitute an affirmative defense.
An examination of the pleadings indicates
that the defendants nor any of them set forth any
facts upon which this defense could be predicated.
CGNCLUSIO '3
It is a fundamental rule of law that where
a court acts upon a fundamentally erroneous theory
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which is apt to affect adversely the substantial
rights of the appellant, the court has committed
prejudicial error, 5 C.J.S. "Appeal and Error,"
Section 1779.

The only way that the instructions

given by the court assume a pertinence to the
issues raised in the trial which at the same time
would justify the court's refusal to grant plaintiff's proposed instructions as hereinbefore set
forth is if one will assume that the court was
applying the law as applicable to felonies as
distinguished from the law applicable to misdemeanors.

Eliminating special cases

~nd

discussing

only general principals, we find that in misdemeaner the la1r1 relative to police officers as
stated in C.J.S. Section 6(2) is:
11An officer does not have the power
to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence
and view and an arrest without a warrant
for a misdemeanor not committed in an
officer's presence may constitute an
assault."

And again at Section 6(4):
"An officer can not arrest without
a warrant a person whom he merely believes
committed a misdemeanor."
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Examining Section 8 of the sa..rne title and
volume we find that the law is substantially
identical as it affects a private person.

There

we see:
"To justify an arrest by a private
person without a warrant for an offense
less than a felony, where permitted·by
statute, it is essential that such
offense shall actually have been
committed or attempted."
In view of the fact that we are considering
an arrest for drunkenness, a misdemeanor, the
court's ruling does not square with the above
enunciated principals because, under the above
law, both private individuals and officers operate under the same disability and in the instant
case, the only place where the question as to
whether Schober and Kendrick were officers becomes
important is as it affects the liability of either
the Union Pacific Railroad or the Ogden Union
Railway and Depot Company, or both, because if the
aforementioned gentlemen were special officers
acting vii thin the scope of their duties as
.•

special officers and not under the control of
their employers, then there could be no liability
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on the part or- their respective employers.
A different problem arises when one considers
a felony.

In 6 C.J.S. "Arrests", Section 6 we

find:
11A peace officer may arrest "tvithout
a warrant one whom he has reasonable or
probable grounds to suspect of having
committed a felony even though the crime
was not cow~itted in his presence and
even though the person suspected is, in
fact, innocent."

The same volume, Section 8, as it relates to an
individual, provides:

nrn order to justify an arrest
(by a private person), it is necessary
and sufficient to show that a felony
was actually committed and that there
was reasonable groruX5 for suspecting
that the person arrested committed it.
Generally mere proof of reasonable and
probable cause for making an arrest
without a ;,.;arrant will not justify a
private person unless a felony has
actually been com..rnitted."
As more tersely stated in American Jurisprudence "Arrest", 22 A.J. Sec_tion 79
"There is a well established
difference betYieen what -vdll justify
an arrest by a private person and what
i,,;ill justify an arrest by an officer ..
Defense of the individual must rest
upon proof both of a reasonable ground
and of the actual commission of a felony,
if no felony was com..rnitted an arrest by a
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private person is illegal and may
give rise to an action, although
the same acts would be O.K. if done
by an officer."
Applying these rules to the Court's
instructions it is obvious that the Court
erroneously applied the law applicable to

If this had been a case involving

felonies.

a felony then reasonable or probable cause and
official status would have become of vital
importance and the instructions requested by
plaintiff should have been denied.
Conversely the instructions given by
the Court were correct if a felony were the
subject of the action, because the question
as to whether or not these men were in fact
officers and/or entitled to the privileges and
immunities of an officer would be of vital
importance.
Ignoring the fact that the court was willing to imply official status to a private employee
because he was designated as a special

agent~

if

one is willing to apply this incorrect theory and
basis for instructions, a. logical coherent pattern
resultso

Unfortunately the major premise upon which
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that theory is based was erroneous in that they
did not have a felony as the subject of the action.
It must therefore be concluded that the court, in
fact, had adopted an erroneous theory and that it
so instructed the jury on an erroneous theory, and
that as a result the jury was deprived of the
opportunity of being properly instructed upon the
law applicable to the issues raised, which could
only have resulted in error prejudicial to the
plaintiff.
The court's instructions five
and

--~n=i=n~e______ ,

eight

as a result, were not applicable

to the issues raised.

As the court has stated in

5 C.J.S. "Appeal and Error 11 , Section 1764:
~ere an instruction, not applicable to the issue, is clearly calculated to mislead - and the complaining
party was prejudiced, the giving of
such instructions is reversable error."

See also Hillyard vs. Blair, 47 Ut 561, 155 P

449; Caperon vs. Tuttle, 100 Ut 476, 116 P(2) 402.
In assuming a,nd

inst~cting

the jury to the

effect that the defendant was a special officer,
the court again committed reversable error.
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rule as set forth in 5 C.J .s., "Appeal and Error",
Section 1776 is:
ttQrdinarily the assumption of a
material fact where the error with regards to it is conflicting or where
it is unsupported by any evidence will
constitute ground for reversal."
The most that can conceivably be held as
far as Schober is concerned is

(1) that there

was a subsequent conflict in testimony as to
whether or not Schober was in fact a special
police officer of Ogden City, and (2) as to
whether or not he ever acted as a special police
officer of Ogden City.

It is submitted that the

court's instructions stating that he 'tvas a special
officer was a clear

ass~mption

of fact that in-

vaded the province of the jury at best, and, in
fact, deprived the plaintiff of an explicit
instruction to the effect that for the purposes
of the action, Mr. Schober was not a special
officer.
Finally, with regard to plaintiff's requested instructions number seven

and

eight

we find in 5 C.J.S. "Appeal and Error" Sec. 1774
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the following statement:
'~en a timely request is made for
instructions which correctly propound the
law and which are warranted by the pleadings••} it is the duty of the court to
give them unless covered by other instructions given by the general charge and a
non-compliance with this duty will necessitate a reversal when it cannot be said that
the appellant was not prejudicial, as
where the court refused correct instructions setting forth the theory of a
parties case, or where the evidence is
conflicting and the verdict general and
it was not possible to say how the jury
would have resolved the question if the
requested instruction had been given.
The refusal to give a proper instruction
is not rendered harmless •••• by the fact
that the issue upon which the charge was
asked below is not urged on appeal.
"Applying these rules judgment has
been reversed for prejudicial error in
failing or refusing to give instructions
in an action ••• or false imprisonment ••• "

That the above statement is likewise law in
Utah see Armstrong vs. Larsen, 186 P 97 where the
court states:
"It was the duty of the court to construe the contract and to advise the jury
of the respective rights of the parties
thereof. The request embodied a correct
interpretation of the contract. It was the
duty of the court to give that or a similar instruction. The failure to do sq, in
our judgment, constituted prejudicial error .. "
It is therefore respectfully submitted that
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the court so incorrectly advised the jury as
to the law applicable to the pleadings involved
in the case at bar as to hopelessly and irreconcilably mislead and confuse the jury as to
render it impossible for the plaintiff to have
had a fair and

L~partial

trial, and that as a

result thereof this case should be reversed and
a new trial ordered.
Resr~:octfully

DAVID S..

submitted,

KUJ:~Z,

Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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